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THE UNIFORM IAW COMMISSION AND COOPERATIVE
FEDERALISM: IMPLEMENTING PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW CONVENTIONS THROUGH UNIFORM STATE LAWS
WILLAM H. HENNING*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Uniform Law Commission' (ULC) is a non-partisan, non-
profit, unincorporated association comprised of commissions formed
in each state of the United States and also the District of Columbia,
Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Its mission is "to promote
uniformity in the law among the several States on subjects as to which
uniformity is desirable and practicable."' In the 117 years of its exis-
tence, the ULC has produced hundreds of uniform laws and for-
warded them to the legislatures of its member jurisdictions for
enactment, often with striking and sometimes with universal success.
Its premier product, produced in partnership with the American Law
Institute (ALI), is the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC), but the laws
* Distinguished Professor of Law, University of Alabama School of Law. Professor
Henning was formerly the Executive Director of the Uniform Law Commission and
currently serves the ULC as an Alabama Commissioner. The opinions expressed in this
article are not necessarily those of the ULC or any of its members. Much of the infor-
mation provided by this article comes from the author's participation in the events
described herein, from conversations with other participants, and from his experience
with the ULC. Professor Henning gratefully acknowledges the generosity of the Univer-
sity of Alabama Law School Foundation, which supports his scholarship.
' The formal name of the ULC is the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. UNIF. LAw COMM'N CONST., art. 1, § 1.1, 2009-2010 REF. BOOK 113
(2009), available at http://www.nccus.org/Update/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=3&
tabid=18#Articlel (last visited May 2, 2010).
2 See UNIF. LAw COMM'N CONST., art. 1, § 1.2, 2009-2010 REF. BOOK 113 (2009), avail-
able at bttp://www.nccusl.org/Update/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabindex=3&tabid=18#Ar-
ticlel (last visited May 2, 2010).
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it promulgates extend far beyond the area of commercial law.3 Among
the many other areas in which the ULC is active, and of particular
importance to the subject of this article, is family law.4 The ULC
chooses its projects carefully, emphasizing acts that facilitate the inter-
state flow of commerce, acts that avoid conflicts when the laws of more
than one state might apply to a particular situation, and acts that fill
emergent needs, modernize antiquated concepts, or codify the com-
mon law.5
Lawmaking in the United States is the shared responsibility of the
federal and state governments, and the areas in which the ULC has
been most successful were once, almost exclusively, the domain of the
states. However, one result of the expansion of the federal govern-
ment's reach that began even before the New Deal and continues in
the early years of the 21st century has been an inevitable encroach-
ment on these areas. In a continental nation bound together by mod-
ern methods of communication and transportation, where people and
transactions move easily across borders, there are undeniable advan-
tages to federal legislation: it can be drafted and enacted quickly, and
it achieves uniformity because under the Constitution it is the supreme
law of the land.' In the areas of law traditionally reserved for the states,
however, these advantages are usually outweighed by a number of dis-
advantages. Congress tends to enact sweeping legislation and then
turn over to regulatory agencies the task of fleshing out the details, but
neither Congress nor the agencies have institutional expertise in these
areas. Moreover, federal legislation is "one-size-fits-all" whereas the
states in adopting a law promulgated by the ULC can maintain a core
of uniformity while adapting the law to idiosyncratic local needs. The
following quote from another article by your author, although written
Other major acts in the commercial law area include the Uniform Electronic
Transactions Act and the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act. See, e.g., UNIF. ELEC. TRANS-
ACTIONS ACT, 9 U.L.A. 67 (1999); UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AcT, 7A U.L.A. 2 (1984).
4See, e.g., UNIF. PARENTAGE Acr, 9B U.L.A. 295 (2002); UNIF. CHII. CUsTODYJURIS-
DICTION AND ENFORCEMENT ACr, 9 U.L.A. 649 (1997); UNIF. INTERsrATE FAMILY SUrrORT
AcT, 9 U.L.A. 159 (2008); UNIF. CHILn AnucTION PREVENTION Acr, 9 U.L.A. 1 (2006).
Among the other areas in which the ULC is active are trust and estate law, the law
governing unincorporated business entities, and real property law.
See STATEMENT OF PoLIcY ESTABLISHING CRITERIA AND PROCEDuRES FOR DESIGNATION
AND CONSIDERATION OF ACTS AND PROCEDURES § 1 (2001), UNIF. LAw COMM'N, 2009-
2010 REFERENCE BOOK 133-34 (2009) available at http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/
aboutus-constitution.asp#policy.
6 U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause).
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with regard only to commercial law, is more broadly applicable and
expresses other concerns:
[C]onsider what will happen if commercial law emanates from the fed-
eral government. The process is almost certain to be political, and only
well-funded interest groups are likely to have access to the decision-mak-
ers. The drafting will typically be done by staffers, perhaps in cooperation
with interest groups, and it is unlikely that there will be an extensive ef-
fort to make certain that each word works and that the provisions of an
act do not have inadvertent and unanticipated negative conse-
quences. . . . By contrast with the federal process, the process by which
[Uniform Commercial] Code amendments and revisions are produced
involves multiple years of careful work by a dedicated committee ... none
of whose members have a political stake in the outcome; at least one dedi-
cated reporter who is a top scholar in the field; ... an open process where
the only price of admission is the travel costs involved in attending meet-
ings and where there is a full opportunity to explain one's needs to the
committee and other observers; and multiple exposures at annual meet-
ings . .. where many members have a deep knowledge of commercial law
and long experience as judges, practitioners, and academics.7
Increasingly in recent years, the ULC has become involved at the fed-
eral level; sometimes by trying to persuade Congress or an agency that
state action is preferable to federal action and sometimes by working
with Congress or an agency so that, to the extent practicable, federal
law is consistent with state law. Without the ULC, it is likely that the
balance in our federal system would have swung even further towards
the federal government than it has.
So what does any of this have to do with private international law?
The following quote from the ULC's Statement of Policy on Interna-
tional Activities expresses the problem well:
With the movement toward globalization, the federal government in-
creasingly participates in the promulgation of private international law
conventions that, upon ratification, become preemptive federal law. This
disrupts the law in areas such as commercial and family law that histori-
cally have been regulated at the state level and that have been the subject
of numerous uniform and model laws promulgated by the Conference.
The states have a profound interest in, to the extent practicable, having
international conventions mesh with their existing laws, influencing the
law's development in other countries so that it is compatible with Ameri-
can legal concepts, and harmonizing their own laws with the laws of other
countries. This will facilitate transactions and movement across borders
and will provide the citizens of the states a familiar and appropriate legal
framework as they participate in the global community. For the same rea-
sons it benefits our citizens and businesses to have uniform state laws, so
7 William H. Henning, Amended Article 2: What Went Wrong? 11 DuQ. Bus. L.J. 131,
141 (2009).
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too will they benefit by having their state laws work in harmony with the
laws of other nations.8
This statement makes clear the interest of the states in the content of
international conventions9 and in the manner in which they are imple-
mented, but it is difficult to protect those interests under our Constitu-
tion, which vests the responsibility for treaty-making in the Executive
and the Senate 0 and under which treaties made under the authority of
the United States are, like federal laws generally, the supreme law of
the land."
The interest of the states in coordinating, to the extent practica-
ble, state law and international conventions may be clear, but what is
the interest in doing so at the federal level? Boiled down to its essence,
it is a respect for federalism that in the past has sometimes manifested
itself in an administration's unwillingness to transmit a convention to
the Senate or in the Senate's refusal to give its advice and consent in
areas where lawmaking is traditionally reserved for the states. As stated
by an eminent scholar in the field:
The principal influence of the states in foreign relations derives from the
constitutional, decentralized, federal framework of government and the
political forces that animate it .... The President has a national constitu-
ency and is chief of a national party, but both are built of local blocks and
he cannot be impervious to their qualities and interests. His diplomatic
representatives are, or are made, acutely aware of our federal charac-
ter-as when they hesitate to negotiate about 'local matters,' or insist on
adding to treaties 'federal-state' clauses that are constitutionally unneces-
sary but politically attractive. The Senate still substantially represents the
8 Policy Position on International Activities, UNIF. ACTIVITIES eNEWSLETTER (UNIF. LAw
COMM'N), May 2006, http://www.nccusl.org/nccusl/newsletters/UniformActivities/
UniformActivities_1ong-May06.htm.
9 Multilateral agreements negotiated under the auspices of international organiza-
tions such as the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law
(UNIDROIT), the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCI-
TRAL), and The Hague Conference on Private International Law (The Hague Confer-
ence) are commonly referred to as conventions rather than treaties. The terms are
equivalent, however. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 301, cmt. a
(1987) ("Whatever their designation, all agreements have the same legal status, except
as their provisions or the circumstances or their conclusion indicate otherwise.").
10 See U.S. CONsT. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (The President "shall have Power, by and with the
Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Sena-
tors present concur"); U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1, 3 (reinforcing the allocation of the
treaty power to the federal level by providing that "[njo State shall enter into any
Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation" and that "[n]o State shall, without the consent of
Congress ... enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a for-
eign Power . . . .")
1 See U.S. CONST., art. VI, § 1, cl. 2 (Supremacy Clause).
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states and has often protected their interests and adopted their views, as
when it refused to consent to treaties that would allow aliens to practice
the professions regardless of state requirements, or entered reservations
to human rights conventions so as not to override state laws permitting
capital punishment for crimes committed by juveniles. The House of
Representatives represents 'the people,' but it is the people of the states,
and [it] is often even more 'parochial' than the Senate, sometimes ob-
structing 'enlightened,' 'internationalist' federal regulation on behalf of
interests that are even less than statewide. And, for their part, states as-
sert their 'international' interests, sometimes in far reaching forms.12
In an era of ever increasing globalization, the United States must
play a leading role in the development of private international law con-
ventions, yet its track record in negotiating and obtaining ratification
of such conventions has been limited, to a significant extent because of
concerns that the conventions will upset the appropriate balance be-
tween federal and state lawmaking;" that is, concerns that the conven-
tions will impact negatively on our federal system.14 If the U.S. fails
repeatedly to ratify international conventions that it participates in ne-
gotiating, its ability to influence future negotiations will be reduced.
No organization is better situated to reassure federal officials that in-
ternational conventions are not unduly disruptive of state interests
than the ULC and thus it is not surprising that the ULC and the State
Department's Office of the Assistant Legal Adviser for Private Interna-
tional Law," known within State as L/PIL, have developed a close
12 Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 167-68 (2d ed. 1996)
(asterisk and footnotes excluded).
13 See id. at 166. Other common concerns include the level of interest among con-
cerned stakeholders and the consistency of the convention regime with U.S. law
generally.
14 Perhaps the most significant private international law convention to which the
United States is a party is the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of
Goods (CISG). The CISG, which was promulgated by UNCITRAL, was ratified by the
U.S. in 1986. A major recent success is U.S. ratification in 2004 of the "Cape Town
Convention," a convention promulgated by UNIDROIT that creates a unified interna-
tional legal regime for the secured financing of highly mobile large aircraft and related
equipment. See UNIDROIT, Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equip-
ment, Nov. 16, 2001, 2307 U.N.T.S. 285; UNIDROIT, Protocol to the Convention on
International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment,
Mar. 1, 2006, 2367 U.N.T.S. 615; 49 U.S.C. § 44113 (2006). UNIDROIT has also
promulgated a protocol on railway rolling stock, which to date the U.S. has not signed,
and is working on a protocol dealing with space assets.
15 The office, which is part of the U.S. Department of State's Office of the Legal
Adviser, "is responsible for the negotiation and conclusion of international conven-
tions, model laws and rules, legislative guides, and other instruments governing private
transactions that cross international borders." See OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER FOR
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working relationship. Each has a distinct sphere of interest and there
is a tension between those spheres, yet there is sufficient overlap that a
significant level of cooperation is in the interests of both. There are
many aspects to the relationship but this article focuses on collabora-
tive decision-making regarding the methods by which international
private law conventions ratified by the United States should be
implemented.
Assuming both the ULC and L/PIL have concluded that a con-
vention is appropriate for ratification, a not insignificant hurdle for
each, a decision must be made regarding the most appropriate
method of implementation. Traditionally, conventions have attained
the force of law in two ways: some are "self-executing," meaning that
upon ratification the language of the convention itself, standing alone,
becomes the law of the United States;"6 in other instances Congress
passes implementing legislation, in which case it is the legislation that
the courts will look to first in determining the effect of the conven-
tion." Under both approaches the law exists entirely at the federal
level, meaning that it preempts inconsistent state law. For obvious rea-
sons, the ULC's strong preference is for the law to reside at the state
level,'" and this raises the question whether an international conven-
tion can be implemented by state law. Although the Constitution pre-
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW, http://www.state.gov/s/1/c3452.htm (last visited May 2,
2010).
'6 Whether a treaty is self-executing is a complex issue and well beyond the scope of
this article. If there is no implementing legislation and an issue regarding the effect of
a convention arises in a legal proceeding, the court must determine whether the con-
vention is self-executing and therefore entitled to the status of federal law. In Medellin
v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 514 (2008), the Supreme Court held that in making this determi-
nation great weight must be given to whether the language of the convention itself,
properly interpreted, indicates that it is to be self-executing, but private international
law conventions rarely address the issue. Some have suggested that Medellin creates a
presumption against self-execution but that the presumption can be overcome by evi-
dence that the Executive and the Senate had a shared understanding to the contrary.
See Am. Soc'y of Int'l Law, ABA/ASIL J. TASK FORCE ON TREATIES IN U.S. LAW (ASIL,
Mar. 2009) (working document), available at http://www.asil.org/files/
TreatiesTaskForceReport.pdf.
17Congress' power to enact implementing legislation is found in the Necessary and
Proper Clause. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
18 The ULC's Executive Committee has adopted as policy a recommendation made
by its International Legal Developments Committee "that implementation through en-
actment of uniform or model laws [at the state level] is the general policy of the Confer-
ence, although each situation [must] be determined on a case-by-case basis." UNIF. LAW
COMM'N, MINUTES OF THE 2007 MIDYEAR MEETING OF THE EXEC. COMM., 3 (Feb. 3-4,
2007), available at http://www.nccusl.org/Update/Minutes/ExecO20307mn.pdf.
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vents the states from becoming direct parties to conventions,", there is
nothing in the Constitution that prevents a convention ratified by the
United States from being implemented at the state level, and the ULC
and L/PIL are currently collaborating on two projects, one of which
will use conditional spending to accomplish precisely that goal and the
other of which may achieve the same result through the use of condi-
tional preemption. Conditional spending and conditional preemption
are examples of what might be called "cooperative federalism," 0 and
the ensuing sections contain a discussion of the methods and the
projects.
II. CONDITIONAL SPENDING: THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE
INTERNATIONAL RECOVERY OF CHILD SUPPORT AND OTHER
FORMS OF FAMILY MAINTENANCE
On November 23, 2007, The Hague Conference on Private Inter-
national Law adopted The Hague Convention on the International Re-
covery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance1 and
moments later the United States became the first country to sign the
convention.22 This dramatic step was possible only because of an un-
precedented collaborative effort involving the ULC, L/PIL, and the
federal Department of Health and Human Services' Office of Child
Support Enforcement (OCSE). It is anticipated that this collaboration
will culminate in ratification of the convention by the federal govern-
ment with implementation accomplished at the state level through
amendments to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA).
Understanding the nature of the collaboration requires some back-
ground information.
19 See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
20 The constitutional foundation for cooperative federalism and the methods that
might be used to accomplish state implementation of private international law conven-
tions are discussed at length in a report prepared for the ULC's International Legal
Developments Committee by Kathleen Patchel, Associate Professor of Law at Indiana
University School of Law-Indianapolis and an Indiana Uniform Law Commissioner. See
Kathleen Patchel, Report: State Law Implementation of Private Int'l Law Treaties,
www.Iaw.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/ecom/patchel-report.pdf (last visited Apr. 24,
2010).
21 See The Hague Convention on the Int'l Recovery of Child Support and Other
Forms of Family Maintenance, Nov. 23, 2007, available at http://www.hcch.net/index
en.php?act=conventions.text&cid=131 (last visited May 2, 2010).
22 See Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law Status Table, http://www.hcch.net/
index.en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=131 (last visited May 2, 2010).
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UIFSA, which was first promulgated in 1992,23 creates uniform
rules for enforcing family support orders across state lines. It does so
by establishing jurisdictional standards that determine the basis upon
which a state court may exercise continuing exclusive jurisdiction over
a child support proceeding, establishing rules for determining which
order is controlling when proceedings are initiated in more than one
jurisdiction, and establishing rules to guide a court in determining
whether to modify another state's child support order. UIFSA was
amended in 1996 just as Congress was implementing sweeping welfare
reforms through the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) .21 PRWORA amended Title IV of the
Social Security Act, which authorizes the Child Support Enforcement
Program (commonly referred to as the IV-D program) to provide fed-
eral money to assist the states in collecting child support from absent
parents, by requiring that states adopt the 1996 version of UIFSA, in
precisely the form promulgated by the ULC,25 in order to be eligible
for continued federal funding. The technique used by Congress is
called "conditional spending" and its use, subject to certain conditions,
has been approved by the Supreme Court.2 6 Conditional spending can
be very effective: the 1992 version of UIFSA was adopted in thirty-five
states; the 1996 version was adopted in almost every state within seven-
teen months after its promulgation.
23 UIFSA replaced the Unif. Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act and the Revised
Unif. Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act. It was developed in close cooperation
with the U.S. Comm'n on Interstate Child Support.
24 Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, 110 Stat.
2105 (1996).
25 42 U.S.C. § 666 (f) (West, Westlaw through 2009 Sess.). UIFSA was amended in
2001 and the requirement that states adopt the 1996 version has been routinely waived
by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services for states adopting
the amendments.
26The constitutional basis for conditional spending is the Spending Clause, U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. In New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), the Supreme
Court held that Congress cannot commandeer the state legislatures and dictate that
they approve a law but it can condition funding on state adoption of a law. Because
states are free to refuse the funds if they do not wish to comply with the conditions, use
of the technique does not violate principles of federalism. See also South Dakota v. Dole,
483 U.S. 203, 207-08 (1987) (establishing four requirements that must be met for con-
ditional spending to be constitutional). In Kansas v. United States, 214 F.3d 1196, 1203-
04 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 53 U.S. 1035 (2000), the court held that the conditions
imposed by PRWORA did not amount to impermissible coercion by the federal
government.
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The Hague Convention establishes "a comprehensive system of
administrative cooperation among nations with respect to support and
the adoption of a system for the recognition and enforcement of sup-
port orders across national boundaries."2 7 L/PIL concluded that the
convention would not be self-executing and that implementation
through federal law would be less than optimal because it would re-
quire the creation of an entirely new bureaucracy to administer, for
international collection efforts, a process that is routinely and effi-
ciently administered at the state level under UIFSA.2 8 It made eminent
sense to assign responsibility for international collections to the ex-
isting state agencies.
In March 2007, the ULC's Executive Committee, working closely
with L/PIL and with representatives of OCSE, created a drafting com-
mittee for the purpose of integrating the rules of the convention into
UIFSA.29 The task was daunting because the language of the conven-
tion, chosen for its adaptability to different legal systems, had to be
converted, to the extent practicable, into language familiar to practi-
tioners and judges used to the language of UIFSA. After more than a
year of work, the ULC at its 2008 Annual Meeting approved a new
version of UIFSA that fully incorporated the convention, primarily in a
new Article 7 but with some conforming amendments to the original
six articles. 0
27 B.R. Robinson, Integrating an International Convention into State Law: the UIFSA Experi-
ence, 43 FAM. L. Q. 61, 61-62 (2009). The negotiating process is described in detail by
the head of the U.S. delegation, Mary Helen Carlson, Attorney-Advisor to L/PIL. See
M.H. Carlson, United States Perspective on the New Hague Convention on the International
Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance, 43 FAM. L. Q. 21 (2009).
28 See Carlson, supra note 28, at 35.
2 The Chair of the drafting committee was the Honorable Battle R. Robinson, a re-
tired Delaware family lawjudge and life member of the ULC who also chaired the 1996
and 2001 UIFSA drafting committees. The Reporter was Prof. John J. Sampson of the
University of Texas School of Law. Prof. Sampson, who served as Co-Reporter (with
Prof. Paul M. Kurtz of the University of Georgia School of Law) for the 1996 revision of
UIFSA and as Reporter for the 2001 amendments, was also a member of the U.S. dele-
gation that negotiated the convention. Although not formally a member of the U.S.
delegation, Commissioner Robinson attended sessions at The Hague under the aus-
pices of the International Bar Association.




On September 8, 2008, President Bush transmitted the conven-
tion to the Senate, requesting its advice and consent,3' and on October
1, 2009, the Obama administration informed the Senate that it sup-
ported the request.3 2 On October 6, 2009, the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations held a hearing on the request and on November 17,
2009, the committee voted without objection to recommend to the full
Senate that it give its advice and consent. 3 Regarding implementa-
tion, the report of the Foreign Relations Committee states as follows:
As noted above, the Convention is largely consistent with current U.S.
federal and state law and practice in the child support enforcement area.
As a result, only minimal changes to U.S. law would be required to allow
for implementation of the Convention. The requisite changes would be
achieved through adoption of an amended version of UIFSA by states
and other relevant jurisdictions, as well as through conforming amend-
ments to Title IV of the Social Security Act.
34
In order to speed the adoption process for UIFSA 2008, in late
2009 the ULC advised the commissioners who lead enactment efforts
in each state that it expected the full Senate to accept the recommen-
dation of the Foreign Relations Committee, and it urged the states to
begin enacting UIFSA 2008 during the 2010 legislative session. 5 The
Senate gave its advice and consent to the Convention on September
29, 2010, and the ULC will now redouble its efforts to gain enactment
in the States. There is no reason to believe that the states will act dif-
ferently than they did after Congress adopted the original spending
condition in 1996 and thus it appears likely that within the next two to
three years the United States will be able to ratify the convention. This
will be an event unprecedented in U.S. history: the ratification of an
international private law convention by the federal government with
the substantive implementing legislation consisting entirely of state
law.
31 Message to the Senate Transmitting The Hague Convention on the Int'l Recovery
of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance, 44 WEEKLY COMP. PREs.
Doc. 1187 (Sept. 8, 2008).
3 2 Hague Convention on Int'l Recovery of Child Support and Family Maintenance, S.
Exec. Rep. No. 111-2, pt. V, at 7 (2010). The Report indicates that the Obama Adminis-
tration specified that it does not intend to deposit the instrument of ratification with
The Hague Conference until all states have adopted UIFSA 2008.
3 See id.
34 Id. at 6.
3 UIFSA 2008 has already been enacted in Maine, Nevada, North Dakota, Tennessee
and Wisconsin. See UNIF. LAw coMM'N, LEG. FACT SHEET, available at http://www.nccusl.
org/Update/uniformact factsheets/uniformacts-fs-uifsa2
0 0 8.asp (last visited Sept. 30,
2010).
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While the experience with the child-support convention proves
the effectiveness of the conditional-spending approach to state imple-
mentation, as a practical matter the method will not often be available
because of the limited circumstances in which there will be a relevant
federal spending program with which to coerce the states. Thus, the
conditional-preemption method described in the next section is likely
to be of more practical use.
III. CONDITIONAL PREEMPTION: THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON
CHOICE OF COURT AGREEMENTS
On June 30, 2005, The Hague Conference adopted The Hague
Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, 3 6 and the United States
signed the convention on January 19, 2009.11 The convention applies
to international business-to-business transactions in which the parties
make an exclusive choice-of-court agreement; that is, they make an ex-
clusive selection of a particular court, or the courts of a particular
country, to resolve their disputes.38 The convention provides that a
court chosen by the parties has jurisdiction to hear their disputes,
courts not chosen by the parties do not have jurisdiction and must
decline to hear their disputes, and a judgment rendered by a chosen
court must be recognized and enforced in the courts of all countries
that are parties to the convention.39
The decision to sign the convention was made in consultation
with the ULC, and the ULC and L/PIL initially determined that the
most appropriate method of implementation would be a technique
commonly referred to as conditional preemption but which might also
be described as reverse preemption. Like conditional spending, condi-
tional preemption uses coercion4 0 to convince the states that it is in
their best interests to adopt legislation designated by Congress. The
coercive threat is that the area of law at issue will be preempted by
36 The Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law, Twentieth Session Final Act, June 30,
2005, http://www.hcch.net/indexen.php?act=conventions.text&cid=98.
3 See Status Table for the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, http:/
/www.hcch.net/index en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=98 (last visited May 2,
2010).
38 The Hague Conference on Private Int'l Law, supra note 37, at art. 3.
3 See id. at art. 8.
4 Although coercive, the states are free not to adopt the designated legislation and
thus conditional preemption does not violate the proscription against commandeering
the state legislatures adopted by the Supreme Court in New York v. United States, 505 U.S.
144 (1992). For further discussion, see supra note 27.
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federal law if the designated legislation is not adopted. An example of
conditional preemption is the federal Digital Signatures in Global and
National Commerce Act,4 ' commonly referred to as "E-Sign," which
provides, with certain exceptions, that its provisions arc preempted in
states that have adopted the Uniform Electronic Transactions Act in
the form promulgated by the ULC.12
In the case of the choice-of-court convention, the current plan is
for the convention to be implemented by federal legislation that per-
mits the states to preempt it, at least to some extent, by adopting a
uniform act drafted by the ULC. In furtherance of this plan, at its
2008 Midyear Meeting the ULC's Executive Committee authorized the
formation of a drafting committee to prepare a Uniform International
Choice of Courts Agreement Act.4 3 The Prefatory Note to the draft of
the act prepared for the 2010 Annual Meeting of the ULC describes
the project's approach to implementation as follows:
The Hague Choice of Court Agreement Act, in conjunction with federal
legislation, will implement the Hague Convention on Choice of Court
Agreements in the United States. The Convention, the product of over a
decade of multilateral negotiations, validates party autonomy by enforc-
ing exclusive choice of court agreements and the judgments that result
from them, as will the Act. The Convention is an immeasurably valuable
treaty that will help create certainty and predictability for transactional
planning, validate party autonomy, facilitate the free movement ofjudg-
ments, and provide a foundation for further cooperation and harmoniza-
tion of law. Implementation through a federal statute including
provisions for states to choose to opt into the Uniform Law will allow this
area to continue to incorporate state law, facilitating greater consistency
with existing state law in the broader area of judgment recognition and
enforcement. 4 4
The quoted language states well one of the principal advantages
of state implementation: legislation affecting one area of state law can
C See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-7031 (2000).
42 See 15 U.S.C. § 7002(a)(1). E-Sign also provides, again with exceptions, that its
provisions may be preempted by other state statutes that are consistent with its provi-
sions, technology neutral, and make specific reference to E-Sign. See 15 U.S.C.
§ 7002(a) (2).
43 The Chair of the committee is Commissioner Rex Blackburn from Idaho and the
Co-Reporters are Prof. Kathleen Patchel of Indiana University School of Law-Indianap-
olis and Prof. Louise Ellen Teitz of the Roger Williams School of Law. See Unif. Law
Coinm'n Drafting Committees, http://www.nccus.org/update/DesktopDefault.
aspx?tabindex=0&tabid=59 (last visited May 2, 2010).
44 UNIF. LAw COMM'N, DRAVr, UNIF. INT'L CHOICE OF COURT AcREEMENTs Ac-r (INTRO-
oucrION) (2010 Annual Mtg. Draft), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/
archives/ulc/hccca/2010am draft.htm.
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have a ripple effect and adversely impact related areas of state law, and
legislation drafted at the federal level is unlikely to consider such an
impact. Put another way, federal implementing legislation may fit into
the overall state scheme like a square peg in a round hole. By contrast,
the ULC, which has over the years developed expertise in entire fields
of state law, may be able to craft the implementing legislation in such a
way that it accomplishes the federal goal but fits more easily into the
existing body of law. The Prefatory Note to the uniform act describes
one such effect:
The recognition and enforcement of judgments is currently a matter of
state rather than federal law. The Uniform Law Commission has pro-
duced two highly successful and widely adopted Acts covering the area of
money judgments from foreign countries, a portion of the area that will
be affected by the Convention [the Uniform Foreign-Money Judgments
Recognition Act (1962) and the revised Uniform Foreign Country
Money-Judgment Recognition Act (2005)].
The Act is drafted to work in conjunction with the existing UFCMJRA,
especially in the area of recognition and enforcement, such as proce-
dures for recognition (Section 20), statutes of limitations (Section 21),
and stays (Section 22). There will be some differences, such as when the
Act applies, it may limit a state's grounds for nonrecognition of ajudg-
ment under the UFCMJRA (e.g., for an inconvenient forum with tag juris-
diction). The Act affects only a small area ofjudgments-those that result
from exclusive choice of court agreements-and its application is not lim-
ited to money judgments (Section 3(8)). Thus there is only a limited
area of overlap with the UFCMJRA.4 5
The choice-of-court project is not as far along as the child-support
project but a great deal of work has been done, and final approval of
the uniform act should occur at the ULC's 2011 Annual Meeting. The
federal implementing legislation is being drafted with input from the
drafting committee, and when all the legislative packages have been
prepared the next step will presumably", be for the State Department,
in consultation with the Justice Department and other federal agen-
cies, to prepare materials to be used by the administration in transmit-
ting the convention to the Senate for its advice and consent. Once
advice and consent are given and the federal implementing legislation
is adopted, preferably with a deferred effective date to give the states
an opportunity to act, the ULC will forward the uniform act to the
4 Id. at 4.
4 L/PIL has not yet made a final determination whether to proceed with the condi-
tional-preemption approach and may ultimately decide that implementation should be
entirely, or predominantly, at the federal level.
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states for adoption. Without the "hammer" of a loss of federal fund-
ing, the rate of adoption is likely to be slower than the rate of adoption
for UIFSA 2008. Whether enough states will adopt the act tojustify use
of the conditional-preemption method remains to be seen.
IV. OTHER IMPLEMENTATION METHODS THAT PRESERVE STATE LAW
Because the focus of this article is on implementation of private
international law conventions through state law, it does not discuss in
detail projects in which the ULC and L/PIL are working together to
implement conventions at the federal level in a manner that preserves,
to the extent practicable, state law. Nevertheless, a brief mention of
two of these projects will provide additional perspective on the wide-
ranging nature of the collaboration. In one project, ajoint committee
composed of members drawn from the UCC's sponsoring organiza-
tions, the ULC and the ALI, worked closely with L/PIL to determine
whether the United Nations Convention on the Assignment of Receiv-
ables in International Trade, 47 the subject matter of which is closely
related to UCC Article 9, should be ratified by the United States and, if
so, the method by which the convention should be implemented.48 It
was determined that ratification was appropriate and that the differ-
ences between the convention and Article 9 did not justify an effort to
amend the UCC in every state. It was ultimately decided that the con-
vention should be self-executing, but that did not end the committee's
work. Again in collaboration with L/PIL, the committee drafted decla-
rations49 and understandings 0 designed to maximize the post-ratifica-
47 The convention was promulgated by UNCITRAL in 2001 and signed by the United
States on Dec. 30, 2003. See G.A. Res. 56/81, U.N. Doc. A/RES/56/81 Uan. 31, 2002),
available at http://daccess-dds-ny.un .org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/NO1 /477/67/PDF/
N0147767.pdPOpenElement [hereinafter U.N. Convention on Assignment of Receivables].
48 Nat'I Conference of Comm'rs on Unif. State Laws, Harmonized North American Law
with Regard to the Assignment of Receivables in International Trade Convention, 1, 4 (July 27-
Aug. 3, 2007), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/aor/2007june
amreport.htm [hereinafter Joint ULC and AL! Committee Report].
4 A declaration is a unilateral statement by a country pursuant to an option provided
for by the convention (i.e., the convention may permit a country to declare that it is not
bound by, or is modifying the effect of, a particular provision). See REsTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN REIATIONs LAw OF THE U.S. § 313 (1987). For example, Arti-
cle 39 of the receivables convention permits states to opt out of chapter V of the con-
vention and the joint committee drafted a declaration stating that the United States
would not be bound by chapter V. Convention on Assignment of Receivable, supra note
50, at 4-5.
50 In an "understanding," an adopting country states its interpretation of a particular
provision without modifying or supplementing it. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
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tion consistency between Article 9 and the convention.5 ' The joint
committee has completed its work, but the convention has not yet
been submitted to the Senate. Presumably the declarations and under-
standings will be transmitted to the Senate with the convention and
the Senate will condition its advice and consent on their inclusion in
the instrument of ratification deposited with UNCITRAL. The Perma-
nent Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code has indicated
that, when the convention is ratified, an Official Comment will be ad-
ded to Article 9 calling attention to the convention and that the PEB
will also issue a more lengthy commentary that discusses the relation-
ship between the convention and Article 9.51
In another project, a joint ULC/ALI committee worked with L/
PIL to determine the most appropriate method of implementing the
United Nations Convention on Independent Guarantees and Standby
Letters of Credit.5 3 In this instance, it was decided that the convention
should not be self-executing but rather should be implemented by fed-
eral legislation drafted by the committee. One reason state implemen-
tation was rejected is similar to the reason for its rejection with regard
to the receivables convention: the rules of the letter-of-credit conven-
tion are the same as those of UCC Article 5 except in two minor re-
spects, 5 4 and it would be inefficient to attempt to amend Article 5 in
each jurisdiction by defining the transactions to which the convention
applies and then applying to those transactions the two different rules
rather than the normal Article 5 rules. In addition, the banking com-
munity expressed concerns about the due-diligence burden that would
be placed on them, and on foreign banks in the chain, if they had to
FOREIGN RElATIONs LAw OF THE U.S. § 313 (1987). For example, the joint committee
drafted an understanding that paragraph 2(e) of article 4 excludes from the conven-
tion an assignment of a receivable that is a security, whether or not it is held by an
intermediary, or of a financial asset or instrument that is held by an intermediary. Joint
ULC and ALI Committee Report, supra note 50, at 6.
'joint ULC and ALI Committee Report, supra note 50, at 4-5.
-2 See PERM. EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIF. COMM'L CODE, MINUTES OF 2008 AND 2009
ANNUAL MEETINGS (on file with author).
53 The convention was promulgated by UNCITRAL in 1995 and signed by the United
States on Dec. 11, 1997. See U.N. Convention on Assignment of Receivables, supra note
48.
54 Memorandum from Edwin E. Smith, Chair, Comm. to Implement the UN Conven-
tion on Indep. Guarantees & Stand-by Letters of Credit, to Uniform Law Comm'rs 1
(June 4, 2009), http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/igasloc/2010june4
report.pdf (last visited Aug. 4, 2010).
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keep up with each state's version of Article 5 and with state-court deci-
sions interpreting the article.
As currently drafted, the implementing legislation will provide
that a standby letter of credit (referred to in the convention as an "in-
ternational independent undertaking") that expressly states that it is
governed by the convention is governed by the text of the convention;
a letter that expressly states that it is governed by a foreign jurisdiction
is governed by the law of that jurisdiction, including the convention if
and as implemented there; and a letter that expressly states that it is
governed by the law of an American state is governed by that state's law
and not by the convention. If a letter does not choose applicable law,
it is governed by the law of the obligor's location as determined by
Section 5-116 of the UCC. If the location is a foreign jurisdiction the
letter is governed by the law of that jurisdiction, including the conven-
tion if and as implemented there, and if the location is an American
state the letter is governed by UCC Article 5 except as to the two minor
differences, in which case it is governed by the convention.5 5 All refer-
ences to Article 5 are to the official text of the article as drafted by the
sponsors, not as it might have been enacted in any particular state.
The method chosen by the committee is the converse of the condi-
tional-spending and conditional-preemption methods in that it will re-
sult in the incorporation of Article 5 by reference into federal law
rather than the enactment of the convention as state law. As with the
receivables convention and Article 9, it is expected that after ratifica-
tion the PEB will add an Official Comment to Article 5 calling atten-
tion to the convention and will issue a commentary discussing the
relationship between the convention and Article 5.
V. CONCLUSION
This brief article merely scratches the surface in terms of the
depth of the collaboration between the ULC and L/PIL, which ex-
tends well beyond working towards the implementation of completed
conventions. Two attorneys from L/PIL serve as Advisory Members of
the ULC and routinely, often with other attorneys from their office,
participate in its annual meetings. Attorneys from L/PIL also rou-
tinely participate in the meetings of the International Legal Develop-
ments Committee, which advises the ULC's Executive Committee with
55 INDEP. GUARANTEES AND STAND-lY LETTERS OF CREDIT CONVENTION IMPLEMENTATION
AcT § 5(a)-(c) (Proposed Draft Oct. 8, 2009), http://www.1aw.upenn.edu/bll/
archives/uIc/igasloc/2009oct8_clean. pdf (last visited May 8, 2010).
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regard to international law issues, and in the meetings of the various
drafting and study committees working on discreet projects. Several
members of the ULC serve on the State Department's Advisory Com-
mittee on Private International Law and in that capacity provide L/PIL
with advice on a wide range of issues, including whether the United
States should encourage the development of conventions in certain ar-
eas. The ULC and L/PIL regularly exchange information on upcom-
ing projects and potential projects of interest, and in selecting experts
to advise it at all stages of its projects and to serve on its negotiating
delegations L/PIL is mindful of the expertise of ULC members and
reporters. The ULC has entered into a memorandum of understand-
ing with the American Bar Association's International Law Section cre-
ating a Joint Editorial Board for International Law (JEB) the purpose
of which, from the ULC's perspective, is to provide it with broad input
from experts regarding all aspects of its international program, and
attorneys from L/PIL regularly participate in JEB meetings.16
We have entered a new era in terms of our global relations and
the prior balance, under which respect for state law at the federal level
was a significant factor in preventing the ratification of many private
international law conventions, is no longer satisfactory. A new bal-
ance-one which respects and protects state law but which permits the
United States to become a party to, and a leader in the promulgation
of, such conventions-must be struck. Finding the right balance is a
slow and difficult process but the collaboration between the ULC and
L/PIL is leading the country in the right direction.
56 See Memorandum of Understanding Joint Editorial Board for Int'l Law (Jan. 3,
2007), http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/jeb/memounderstanding.pdf.
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